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INADEQUACY OF TRIPS & THE 
COMPULSORY LICENSE: WHY BROAD 
COMPULSORY LICENSING IS NOT A 
VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE ACCESS TO 
MEDICINE PROBLEM 
INTRODUCTION 
rectile dysfunction, cancer, and HIV/AIDS are not gener-
ally thought of as falling within the same class of medical 
illness. Erectile dysfunction is often characterized as a non-life-
threatening condition,1 while cancer is labeled a life-style dis-
ease,2 and HIV/AIDS as an epidemic.3 Yet, medications for all 
three health problems have had their drug patents broken by a 
compulsory license under the Agreement on Trade-Related As-
pects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).4 The goal of 
TRIPS is to provide access to essential medications in cases of 
national public health emergency by granting a compulsory li-
cense of a patented medication.5 The drafters’ intent was to 
balance intellectual property (“IP”) rights with access to afford-
able medications.6 Yet the vagueness of TRIPS and its compul-
sory license provisions, specifically Articles 30 and 31, has 
caused much controversy and opposition.7 Consequently, 
TRIPS has not been utilized to its fullest nor has it been uti-
lized as its drafters intended. It is doubtful, for example, that 
the drafters of TRIPS intended erectile dysfunction to be cov-
ered under the Article 31 public health emergency exception to 
                                                                                                                                     
 1. See Erectile Dysfunction Treatment, REVITA: ANTI-AGING CENTER, 
http://www.revitaantiagingcenter.com/erectile-dysfunction-treatment/ (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
 2. See Cancer is a Preventable Lifestyle Disease, TIME FOR WELLNESS 
(Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.timeforwellness.org/blog-view/cancer-is-a-
preventable-lifestyle-disease-115. 
 3. See David Gratzer, The WTO’s Drug Problem, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE 
FOR POLICY RESEARCH (Jan. 21, 2003), http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/miarticle.htm?id=3276. 
 4. See Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of 
Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS 
MED., Jan. 2012, at 1, 4. 
 5. See Gratzer, supra note 3. 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. 
E
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patent rights, which allows third parties to manufacture a pa-
tented medication without the consent of the patent owner. 8 At 
the other end of the spectrum, HIV/AIDS is explicitly covered 
under this exception.9 Furthermore, as the number of cancer 
deaths increases, it has become less clear whether life-style 
disease medications should be covered.10 Thus, as these three 
brief examples illustrate, the scope of compulsory licenses must 
be better defined to properly balance the countervailing goals of 
IP rights with access to medicines, and to allow TRIPS to more 
successfully achieve these dual goals.  
Balancing countervailing goals is never an easy feat, especial-
ly in international IP where countries vary in economic, social, 
and cultural terms.11 It follows, then, that providing access to 
affordable medicines has been a challenge for the international 
community, which must balance improving global health 
against the IP rights of patent holders of life-saving medica-
tions.12 Both interests are supported by parties having deeply 
entrenched goals with different primary priorities and different 
approaches.13 On the one hand, developing countries and non-
profit organizations have a primary focus of ensuring access to 
affordable medicines for those in poverty.14 Developing coun-
tries often lack the capabilities and infrastructure to create IP, 
such as patentable drugs, and are thus primarily IP importers, 
and lack an incentive to protect IP.15 These countries favor 
weaker IP rights,16 which allow market entry of generic drug 
                                                                                                                                     
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Kevin Outterson, Disease-Based Limitations on Compulsory Li-
censes Under Articles 31 and 31bis, 1–2, 17–21 (B.U. Sch. Law, Working Pa-
per No. 09–26, 2009). 
 11. See Daniel C.K. Chow & Edward Lee, INTERNATIONAL IP: PROBLEMS, 
CASES, AND MATERIALS 197 (2006). 
 12. See Brittany Whobrey, International Patent Law and Public Health: 
Analyzing TRIPS’ Effect on Access to Pharmaceuticals in Developing Coun-
tries, 45 BRANDEIS L.J., 623–624 (2007). 
 13. See Alexandra G. Watson, International IP Rights: Do TRIPS’ Flexibil-
ities Permit Sufficient Access to Affordable HIV/AIDS Medicines in Develop-
ing Countries?, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 149–150 (2009). 
 14. See Whobrey, supra note 12, at 623–624. 
 15. Chow, supra note 11, at 12. 
 16. See Whobrey, supra note 12, at 625. 
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manufacturers and increased market competition.17 Market 
entry and competition lower drug prices, resulting in increased 
availability of affordable medications.18 On the other hand, de-
veloped countries and the pharmaceutical industry primarily 
focus on protecting their valuable IP, namely patented medica-
tions.19 Developed countries are primarily IP exporters20 and 
thus seek stronger IP rights to ensure protection both abroad 
and domestically.21 Similarly, pharmaceutical companies assert 
that strong IP rights are required to recoup their research and 
development costs—which can exceed $800 million for each 
successful drug—and to incentivize future innovation.22 
Although neither concern over global health nor IP are new 
issues in the international community, they were initially con-
templated as separate and competing interests and were only 
brought together for the first time under TRIPS. International 
commitment to global health was highlighted as early as the 
1940s with the formation of the United Nations,23 the World 
Health Organization,24 and the World Bank Group25 and has 
been reaffirmed repeatedly, appearing in the Millennium De-
velopment Goals26 established by the United Nations Millenni-
um Declaration27 in September 2000. Likewise, protection of IP 
rights through international initiatives is not a novel concept; 
                                                                                                                                     
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Chow, supra note 11, at 453. 
 20. Id. at 12. 
 21. See id. at 8–9. 
 22. Id. at 10–11, 453. 
 23. UN at a Glance, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2011). 
 24. About WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.who.int/about/en/ (last visited June 13, 2013). 
 25. HIV/AIDS Prevention Additional Financing, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P144537/hivaids-prevention-additional-
financing?lang=en (last visited Feb. 20, 2013). 
 26. Background, UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS, 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml (last visited Sept. 22, 2011). 
 27. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 
18, 2000), available at 
http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf. 
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it is rooted in the 1883 Paris Convention,28 which was echoed 
with the formation of the World Intellectual Property Organi-
zation (“WIPO”)29 in 1967 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty30 
in 1970. However, in 1994, when the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”)31 adopted TRIPS,32 the two competing interests 
clashed. TRIPS linked IP to trade, and trade affects access to 
medications.33 Though the TRIPS negotiations pitted develop-
ing and developed countries against each other,34 all 153 WTO 
member countries adopted TRIPS on April 15, 1994, which at-
tempted to create strong international IP rights by setting 
basic standards.35 However, in an attempt to balance strong IP 
rights with access to essential medicines, TRIPS included cer-
tain flexibilities intended to support global health, particularly 
compulsory licensing and parallel importation,36 which will be 
discussed infra in Part I.B.  
This Note will analyze whether TRIPS has successfully bal-
anced its two competing goals of protecting IP and improving 
access to medicines. The analysis will illustrate several imped-
iments to TRIPS in the approximately fifteen years after its 
                                                                                                                                     
 28. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.p
df. 
 29. About WIPO, WORLD IP ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/about-
wipo/en/what_is_wipo.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2011). 
 30. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 
U.N.T.S. 231, available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/pct.pdf. 
 31. The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 
2013). 
 32. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of IP Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 33. Chow, supra note 11, at 25. 
 34. See Watson, supra note 13, at 149–150. 
 35. The WTO, supra note 31; Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Pa-
tents Obligations and Exceptions, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm02_e.htm (2011) [here-
inafter TRIPS Fact Sheet]. Currently there are 193 WTO member countries 
which have all adopted TRIPS. Tina S. Bhatt, Note, Amending TRIPS: A New 
Hope for Increased Access to Essential Medicines, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 597, 
600 (2008). 
 36. The WTO, supra note 31; TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra note 35. 
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implementation and will highlight special challenges concern-
ing access to chronic disease medications. This analysis will 
show that TRIPS is an ineffective solution for the access to 
medicine problem. The Note will then suggest recommenda-
tions for amending TRIPS to better achieve its two policy goals, 
as well as suggest a supplemental market approach to TRIPS 
that will best ensure access to both communicable (i.e., infec-
tious) and non-communicable (i.e., chronic) disease medica-
tions. 
In light of the treaty’s deficiencies, the amendment to TRIPS 
proposed here will require a three-tier pricing system and will 
also prohibit parallel importation. A supplementary market 
approach will be an alternative to compulsory licensing. The 
market approach for all practical purposes must be advanta-
geous to pharmaceutical companies and developed countries, 
while still providing needed medications to developing coun-
tries. Under this approach, compulsory licensing should have a 
limited scope and interpretation, as the market alternative 
should be the dominant route to distribute medications. Part I 
will discuss the timeline and background of international IP 
initiatives and will end with a discussion of the relevant provi-
sions of TRIPS. Part II will identify problems and recent im-
pediments to TRIPS. Part III will survey special challenges in 
the area of chronic diseases. Finally, Part IV will propose rec-
ommendations to strengthen TRIPS and to better promote its 
dual goals in the face of increased hostility and dissatisfaction 
of all involved parties. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. International IP Initiatives: Road to TRIPS 
The first international IP agreement was the Paris Conven-
tion of 1883.37 Although it was a major step to address IP on a 
global scale, the Paris Convention lacked substantive stand-
ards for IP, and left member countries to structure their do-
mestic IP laws as desired.38 For example, the Paris Convention 
did not impose a standard definition of patentable subject mat-
                                                                                                                                     
 37. Chow, supra note 11, at 25. 
 38. Id. at 270. 
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ter, resulting in inconsistencies where some countries excluded 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology from patent protection.39 
Lack of enforcement capabilities presented additional limita-
tions to the Paris Convention.40 A more significant attempt at 
international harmonization occurred in 1967 with the creation 
of WIPO, a specialized agency under the United Nations.41 
However, like the Paris Convention, WIPO lacked a global en-
forcement mechanism.42 In 1994, the WTO adopted TRIPS, 
which is currently the leading international IP treaty and links 
IP to trade.43 
The key improvement that makes TRIPS a stronger treaty 
than past international IP regimes is its enforcement capabil-
ity, established through “an elaborate Dispute Settlement 
Body” under the WTO.44 Due to this improvement, TRIPS is 
not a “toothless organization” and has “real powers to impose 
[trade] sanctions” on member countries that do not comply with 
the minimal substantive IP standards set forth in TRIPS.45 
Further, TRIPS includes minimal standardized substantive 
                                                                                                                                     
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 26. 
 41. See Margot Kaminski, The Origins and Potential Impact of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 247, 248 (2009). 
 42. See Chow, supra note 11, at 26. The WIPO international harmoniza-
tion effort was much larger, containing 175 member countries, compared to 
only eleven member countries bound by the Paris Convention. See Kaminski, 
supra note 41, at 248; Chow, supra note 11, at 64. 
 43. Chow, supra note 11, at 25, 58. 
 44. Id. at 26. 
When one member challenges another’s actions as violating a specif-
ic WTO agreement or principle, the issue is brought before the Dis-
pute Resolution Body (DRB). The DRB holds proceedings and issues 
decisions . . . . If a country loses a dispute and does not cooperate and 
abide by the DRB’s decisions, the WTO has the power to authorize 
trade sanctions against the losing party. 
Whobrey, supra note 12, at 628; TRIPS is a non-self-executing treaty, as ar-
ticulated in Article 1.1, meaning each member country must enact domestic 
legislation to comply with the standards set forth in TRIPS. Chow, supra note 
11, at 289; see TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 68 (establishing the TRIPS Council 
to monitor compliance by member countries with TRIPS and to interpret its 
provisions); see also Chow, supra note 11, at 292. 
 45. Chow, supra note 11, at 26, 58. 
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rights for patent protection,46 lacking in past international IP 
agreements. For example, TRIPS prohibits denying patents 
“based on the field of technology” and thus requires all member 
countries to protect pharmaceutical and biotechnology pa-
tents.47 It also requires patent protection for a minimum of 
twenty years in member countries.48 Attempting to balance 
these stronger IP standards, TRIPS also includes exceptions, 
called TRIPS flexibilities, in order to appease the competing 
interest of global health.49 
B. Relevant Provisions of TRIPS: TRIPS Flexibilities 
1. General Public Health Provisions 
Article 28 of TRIPS lays out the exclusive rights of patent 
holders, namely, the exclusive right to make, use, offer for sale, 
sell, or import the patented good.50 The patent holder also has 
the exclusive right to assign, transfer, or license the patent.51 
The compromise and balance between strong IP rights and at-
tempts to promote public health is seen generally in Article 
                                                                                                                                     
 46. See  id. at 271. Substantive minimum standards of patent protection in 
TRIPS include, but are not limited to: 
[First,] countries must allow for the patenting of processes and may 
not deny patents based on the field of technology . . . . [Second,] 
TRIPS also delineates what exclusive rights a patent must entail 
and for how long, and puts limitations on when countries may enact 
exceptions or compulsory licenses to patents . . . . [Third, TRIPS] also 
requires countries to afford judicial review of any revocation or for-
feiture of a patent. 
Id.; see TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 27–34 (setting the minimal terms for pa-
tent protection). 
 47. Chow, supra note 11, at 271; TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 27(1). Prior to 
TRIPS over forty countries had no patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products. Josephine Johnston & Angela A. Wasunna, Patents, Biomedical 
Research, and Treatments: Examining Concerns, Canvassing Solutions, 37 
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT (SPECIAL REPORT), no.1, S1, S5 (2007). 
 48. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 33. 
 49. See Bhatt, supra note 35, at 600. See also TRIPS Fact Sheet, supra 
note 35; Chow, supra note 11, at 336. 
 50. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 28(1). 
 51. Id. art. 28(2). 
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8(1) and Article 27(2).52 Article 8(1) demonstrates that public 
health was a concern during the drafting of TRIPS, where it 
allows member countries to “adopt measures necessary to pro-
tect public health, nutrition, and to promote the public interest 
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and tech-
nological development, provided that such measures are con-
sistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”53  Article 27(2) 
excludes patentability of inventions that are “necessary to pro-
tect the ordre public or morality,” including those inventions 
that protect human life or health.54 
2. Compulsory Licensing 
Article 30 and Article 31 more clearly state the exceptions to 
the IP rights held by a patent owner and attempt to address 
the access to medicine concern of developing countries. These 
exceptions are often referred to as the “TRIPS flexibilities.”55 
Article 30 allows member countries to provide “limited excep-
tions” to a patent holder’s exclusive rights,56 “provided that 
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal ex-
ploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the 
legitimate interests of third parties.”57 Article 31 offers a more 
detailed exception to a patent holder’s exclusive rights, specifi-
cally the compulsory license exception.58 This exception re-
quires a third party to first attempt to negotiate a voluntary 
license with the patent holder before requesting a compulsory 
license through the third party’s government.59 However, Arti-
cle 31 allows third parties to bypass the voluntary license nego-
tiation in cases of “a national emergency or other circumstanc-
es of extreme urgency60 or in cases of public non-commercial 
                                                                                                                                     
 52. See id. art. 8(1), 27(2). 
 53. Id. art. 8(1). 
 54. Id. art. 27(2). 
 55. Bhatt, supra note 35, at 600. 
 56. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 28, 30 (Article 28 refers to the patent hold-
er’s exclusive rights). 
 57. Id. art. 30. 
 58. See id. art. 31. 
 59. Id. art. 31(b). 
 60. See discussion infra Part II.A.3. TRIPS does not define “national emer-
gency” or “extreme urgency”—a deficiency that will be discussed below.  
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use.”61 This emergency compulsory license exception is limited 
to requiring compulsory licenses to be “authorized predomi-
nantly” for domestic use.62 
3. Parallel Importation 
In addition to the compulsory license, another significant 
TRIPS flexibility is the concept of parallel importation alluded 
to in Article 6.63 Parallel importation results from price dis-
crimination, where a particular product is sold at different 
prices in different countries, and is based on the concept of ex-
haustion.64 Exhaustion, or the first sale doctrine, states that 
after a sale the prior possessor of a product relinquishes all 
rights to the product and the new possessor is able to distribute 
and import it at will.65 Opponents of exhaustion, including 
pharmaceutical companies, contend that it “decreases profita-
bility and removes the incentive to sell drugs to poor countries 
at lower prices.”66 Further, there is a concern that some corrupt 
governments of developing countries may resell the discounted 
drugs received at higher profits to other countries, rather than 
provide the discounted drugs to their citizens in need.67 TRIPS 
neither bans nor authorizes parallel importation.68 
C. Response to TRIPS: International Clarification of TRIPS 
1. The Doha Declaration 
After developing countries raised concerns as to the scope of 
interpretation of the TRIPS flexibilities and its relation to the 
issue of access to medicines, the WTO issued a Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health at a conference in Doha, Qatar in 
                                                                                                                                     
 61. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 31(b). TRIPS requires “adequate remunera-
tion” be paid to the patent holder in cases where a government does in fact 
grant a compulsory license. Id. art. 30(h). 
 62. Id. art. 31(f). 
 63. See id. art. 6. 
 64. Chow, supra note 11, at 428. 
 65. Id. at 419. 
 66. Whobrey, supra note 12, at 633. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 6 (“[N]othing in this Agreement shall be 
used to address the issue of exhaustion . . . .”). 
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2001.69 The Doha Declaration70 reaffirmed the need to balance 
grave “public health problems afflicting many developing . . . 
countries”71 with “intellectual property protection[, which] is 
important for the development of new medicines.”72 Further, 
paragraph four of the Doha Declaration states that TRIPS 
“should be interpreted and implemented in a manner support-
ive of WTO member’s right to protect public health and, in par-
ticular, to promote access to medicines for all” and that the 
flexibilities were provided “for this purpose.”73 The Doha Decla-
ration also affirms that each member country can determine 
the circumstances for granting compulsory licenses, the cir-
cumstances constituting a national emergency, and can estab-
lish its own policy on exhaustion.74 It specifically states that a 
public health crisis may include, but is not limited to, those “re-
lating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidem-
ics.”75 
Lastly, the Doha Declaration recognizes a problem created by 
Article 31(f) of TRIPS regarding the use of compulsory licens-
es.76 Article 31(f) restricts compulsory licenses to manufactur-
ing goods “predominantly” in the domestic country.77 However, 
many developing countries do not have the manufacturing, in-
frastructure, or expertise to domestically produce pharmaceuti-
cal products and thus these countries would not be able to use 
the compulsory license flexibility.78 Paragraph six of the Doha 
                                                                                                                                     
 69. Chow, supra note 11, at 459. 
 70. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001: Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Public Health 
Declaration]. 
 71. Id. ¶ 1 (specifically recognizing public health concerns in “HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics”). 
 72. Id. ¶ 3. 
 73. Id. ¶ 4. 
 74. Id. ¶ 5. 
 75. Id. ¶ 5(c). 
 76. Vishal Gupta, A Mathematical Approach to Benefit-Detriment Analysis 
as a Solution to Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS 
Agreement, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 631, 643 (2005). 
 77. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 31(f). 
 78. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 70, ¶ 6. See also Chow, 
supra note 11, at 461. “[A]bout 80% of developing countries lack a functional 
pharmaceutical sector capable of producing [antiretroviral medications used 
to treat HIV/AIDS].” Aileen M. McGill, Compulsory Licensing of Patented 
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Declaration recognizes this issue and requests the WTO Coun-
cil for TRIPS79 to propose a solution.80 
2. Paragraph Six Decision 
On August 30, 2003, the WTO General Council reached a so-
lution to the problem recognized in paragraph six of the Doha 
Declaration.81 This solution, known as the “Implementation 
Decision” or “Paragraph 6 Decision,” created a waiver for Arti-
cle 31(f) of TRIPS by which a country that lacks manufacturing 
capabilities may now import a specific pharmaceutical prod-
uct.82 However, the Paragraph 6 Decision contains a number of 
restrictions on this waiver, complicating the importation pro-
cess.83 In 2005, the WTO General Council voted to amend 
TRIPS to permanently include the Implementation Decision as 
Article 31bis.84 The amendment will take effect after ac-
ceptance by two-thirds of the member countries.85 
                                                                                                                                     
Pharmaceuticals: Why A WTO Administrative Body Should Determine What 
Constitutes a Public Health Crisis Under The Doha Declaration, 10 WAKE 
FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 69, 93 (2009). 
 79. TRIPS supra note 32, art. 68 (establishing the Council for TRIPS to 
monitor the operation of TRIPS and members’ compliance with their obliga-
tions, and affords members the opportunity to consult the Council on related 
matters). 
 80. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 70, ¶ 6. 
 81. Decisions of General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and 
Corr. 1, 43 I.L.M. 509 (Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Implementation Agree-
ment]. 
 82. Id. ¶ 2. 
 83. Id. The waiver applies only “for the purposes of production of a phar-
maceutical product. . . .” Id. It also imposes several notification requirements 
and labeling requirements. Id. ¶ 2(b)(iii). 
 84. TRIPS and Public Health: Members Accepting Amendment of the 
TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated 
Jan. 5, 2012); see also Chow, supra note 11, at 464. 
 85. TRIPS and Public Health, supra note 84. The deadline to accept the 
amendment has been pushed back to December 31, 2013. Id. As of February 
16, 2013, forty-three of the 155 members have approved the amendment, in-
cluding the United States. Id.; Understanding the WTO: The Organization 
Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited 
May 10, 2012) (listing all 155 members and observers of the WTO). 
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II. PROBLEMS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO TRIPS & ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 
A survey of a multitude of factors highlights the problems 
and impediments to successful use of TRIPS. These include: 
complicated procedural requirements, actual use of compulsory 
licensing, definitional ambiguities, limitations inherent in de-
veloping countries, retaliation by pharmaceutical companies 
and developed countries, and legal challenges to compulsory 
license laws and grants. As a result of these factors TRIPS has 
not been used to its fullest ability and has also not been used as 
its drafters intended. Consequently, the dual goals of balancing 
IP rights with access to essential medicines have not been fully 
achieved. 
A. Problems 
1. Complicated Procedural Requirements 
Compulsory licensing is a complicated process requiring a 
number of procedural hurdles to be met prior to issuing the 
compulsory license.86 “Even if a developing country is ultimate-
ly successful in authorizing a compulsory license . . . the delays 
in authorization due to [the mandatory] judicial review [or oth-
er independent review] may discourage licensees from produc-
ing generic versions . . . as they will have less time to recover 
start-up costs.”87 Further, the Paragraph 6 Decision is not a 
                                                                                                                                     
 86. See generally Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or 
Failure, as Measured by Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 
390–392 (2011). TRIPS Article 31(a)—(l) states a long list of procedural re-
quirements a country must satisfy prior to compulsory licensing, which in-
clude: “use [of the license] shall be considered on its individual merit,” “scope 
and duration of the use must be limited to the authorized purpose,” “judicial 
or other independent review of the use authorization,” use is “contingent on 
adequate remuneration” to the patent holder, which “must take into account 
the economic value of the authorization” and is “subject to judicial or other 
independent review.” Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Pa-
tent Rights and Public Health, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1469, 1488 (2007) [here-
inafter A New World Order]. But see id. (“Despite the long list of procedural 
requirements . . . compliance with these requirements has not generally been 
an issue.”). 
 87. Brent Savoie, Thailand’s Test: Compulsory Licensing in an Era of Epi-
demiologic Transition, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 239 (2007). 
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streamlined procedure and is time-consuming, expensive, and 
has been rarely used.88 In addition, many countries have not 
enacted domestic legislation to incorporate the Paragraph 6 
Decision, making it non-operational.89 Canada was the first 
and only country to use the Paragraph 6 Decision to export a 
generic AIDS drug to Rwanda after issuance of a compulsory 
license.90 However, due to the complicated process (cumber-
some to both the eligible exporting and importing countries), 
lack of incentives, huge costs, time commitment, and challeng-
es in recovery costs, the director of public affairs for the generic 
drug firm stated that it would not use the Paragraph 6 system 
again.91 Fears that the procedures for the Paragraph 6 Decision 
                                                                                                                                     
The longer the issuance of compulsory licenses is delayed after pa-
tented drugs enter the marketplace, the less time licensees have to 
recover their start-up costs and the more difficult it is to achieve ef-
fective competition among multiple generic substitute suppliers. 
Thus, if compulsory licensing is to be successful, expeditious licens-
ing procedures are a necessity. 
F. M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented 
Medicines in Developing Nations, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 913, 924 (2002). 
 88. See generally A New World Order, supra note 86, at 1492–1493 (provid-
ing an overview of the procedures and requirements prior to allowing com-
pulsory licensing of drugs for export under the Paragraph 6 Decision); Harris, 
supra note 86, at 389–392; Holger Hestermeyer, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 261–272 (2007) (offer-
ing a more detailed overview of the Paragraph 6 Decision and its procedural 
requirements). 
 89. A New World Order, supra note 86, at 1491–1492. Norway, Canada, 
India, and the EU are the only potential exporting countries that have for-
mally informed the TRIPS Council that they have enacted domestic legisla-
tion to comply with the Paragraph 6 Decision. TRIPS and Health: Frequently 
Asked Questions— Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (2006). 
 90. Harris, supra note 86, at 389–390. 
 91. Id. at 389–391. It took more than four years to ship generic AIDS med-
ications to Rwanda, where two years were spent negotiating between the ge-
neric drug manufacturer and the patent holders. Id. Concerns over the com-
pulsory license being issued for too short a term—making it difficult for the 
generic drug maker to recover costs for investing in the manufacture of the 
medicines—further complicates the issue. Id. The scope and duration of a 
compulsory license is limited by Article 31(c), where the compulsory license 
must be terminated when the circumstances for the issuance of the compul-
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are “so complicated that it will remain virtually unused until 
the WTO reforms the system to make it less cumbersome and 
more streamlined” were presented during the TRIPS Council’s 
October 2010 meeting.92 
2. Actual Use of Compulsory Licensing 
Few countries have made use of the TRIPS flexibilities.93 
Over the approximately fifteen years that Article 31 has been 
in force, only a handful of countries have issued compulsory 
licenses under its authority, and only one country has issued a 
compulsory license under the 2003 Paragraph 6 Decision.94 The 
disuse of the TRIPS flexibilities and the United States’ and 
pharmaceutical companies’ negative reactions to South Africa’s 
1997 attempt to provide cheaper HIV/AIDS medications led to 
clarification of TRIPS in the Doha Declaration.95 Eight years 
after Doha, and fifteen years after the signing of TRIPS, only 
fifty-two countries have issued compulsory licenses.96 Some 
                                                                                                                                     
sory license ceases. Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 250. However, an im-
portant caveat is that the “legitimate interests of the beneficiary of the li-
cense must be adequately protected.” Id. This caveat is important because 
“the beneficiary of a license has to make investments before it can work the 
license and it would be difficult to find a beneficiary willing to do so if the 
license is liable to be terminated at any given moment.” Id. 
 92. Harris, supra note 86, at 391–392. Concerns over the limited use of the 
Paragraph 6 mechanism were also discussed at the March 2010 TRIPS Coun-
cil meeting. Id. at 391; see also William New, WTO Paragraph 6 Meeting 
Aims At Improved Use Of Health Waiver, IP WATCH (Oct. 16, 2010, 5:20pm), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/10/16/wto-paragraph-6-meeting-aims-
at-improved-use-of-health-waiver/. 
 93. But see Savoie, supra note 87, at 237 (stating that although compulsory 
licensing has not been utilized extensively, there is a recent trend towards 
increased issuance of compulsory licenses by developing countries). 
 94. See generally Harris, supra note 86, at 387–390. 
 95. Savoie, supra note 87, at 234; see generally Pier DeRoo, Public Non—
Commercial Use: Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Drugs in Govern-
ment Health Care Programs, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 347, 354–359 (2011) (provid-
ing a detailed overview of South Africa’s 1997 attempt at National Emergen-
cy Compulsory Licensing for HIV/AIDS medications and the negative reac-
tions that followed). 
 96. Ellen F. M. ‘t Hoen, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF PHARMACEUTICAL 
MONOPOLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE APPLICATION 
OF THE WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH xv-xvi (2009). 
“Between 2001 and end 2007, 52 developing and least-developed countries 
have issued post-Doha compulsory licenses for production or import of generic 
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countries, particularly Brazil, threaten using compulsory li-
censes as a negotiation tool to lower drug prices.97 However, it 
is the actual use of compulsory licenses that achieves the low-
est prices, not mere threats.98 
Since compulsory licensing is infrequently used, TRIPS has 
not effectively reduced the price of drugs on a broad scale, 
which is essential to increasing access to medicines.99 Newer, 
more effective drugs are six times more expensive than older 
treatments where the patents have expired.100 Further, when 
compulsory licensing is used, TRIPS limits generic manufac-
turers to producing only the quantities predefined in each com-
pulsory license.101 This limitation “curbs the large-scale produc-
                                                                                                                                     
versions of patented medicines, given effect to government use provisions, 
and/or implemented the non-enforcement of patents.” Id. at xvi; see, e.g., Ex-
amples of Health—Related Compulsory Licenses, CONSUMER PROJECT ON 
TECHNOLOGY, http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2011) (listing examples of countries and their issuance of 
health related compulsory licenses); see also Dep’t of Indust. Pol’y & Promo-
tion, Discussion Paper—Compulsory Licensing, GOV’T OF INDIA MINISTRY OF 
COMMERCE & INDUS., at 3 (Aug. 24, 2010), available at 
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Archive/ArchiveFeed.aspx; see also DeRoo, supra 
note 95, at 358–359. 
 97. See Harris, supra note 86, at 387–388. Brazil’s use of its compulsory 
licensing provision as a negotiation tool has lowered HIV mortality rates by 
50% in the 536,000 HIV infected Brazilians. Chow, supra note 11, at 454. 
 98. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Brazil Takes Steps To Import Cheaper AIDS 
Drug Under Trade Law, IP WATCH (May 7, 2007, 1:50pm), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2007/05/07/brazil-takes-steps-to-import-cheaper-aids-drug-
under-trade-law/?res=1280&print=0. Negotiations between Thailand and 
Merck, and between Brazil and Merck, for the HIV/AIDS drug efavirenz show 
that the pharmaceutical companies offered their lowest prices after receiving 
a compulsory license. Id.  
Brazil had achieved a price for efavirenz of $580 per patient per year 
earlier when it had threatened to use compulsory license. But this 
was too expensive compared with the price for generics (Thailand 
was offered $244 per patient per year after it issued a [compulsory 
license]), and thus Brazil has paid too much for too many years. . . .  
Id. Also, when few or no licenses are actually issued, repeated, hollow threats 
of use erode the negotiating power of the compulsory license. Id. 
 99. Bhatt, supra note 35, at 600. 
 100. AIDS, Drug Prices and Generic Drugs, AVERT, 
http://www.avert.org/generic.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2013) [hereinafter 
AVERT] (discussing, specifically, pricing of HIV/AIDS drugs). 
 101. Id. 
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tion that is required to deliver drugs cheaply.”102 Also, some 
argue the price of drugs after a compulsory license does not jus-
tify the massive intrusion on patent rights because the price is 
not low enough and is still out of reach for the poor.103 Moreo-
ver, actually granting a compulsory license is not necessary to 
lower the price of drugs.104 Market competition and negotia-
tions between large pharmaceutical companies and generic 
drug manufacturers have proven to lower drug prices. For ex-
ample, a price war and social pressure, not issuance of a com-
pulsory license between the pharmaceutical company and the 
generic drug makers, led to AIDS medications being reduced 
from about $10,000 per person per year in 1996 to $295 in 
2001.105 
Further, compulsory licenses have been predominantly is-
sued for health related emergencies of HIV/AIDS, and thus 
their use has been very limited in scope.106 In addition, despite 
compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS drugs, 14.6 million people 
globally still lacked access to antiretroviral drugs at the end of 
2009, which translates to a mere 36% coverage rate.107 In the 
2011 Millennium Development Goals Report, the WHO stated 
that it had not reached its 2010 target for universal access to 
HIV/AIDS treatment.108 91% of pregnant women in need of an-
tiretroviral drugs live in largely impoverished sub-Saharan Af-
                                                                                                                                     
 102. Id. 
 103. Watson, supra note 13, at 154. 
 104. See generally AVERT, supra note 100. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See ‘t Hoen, supra note 96, at xvi–xvii; DeRoo, supra note 95, at 359. 
But see DeRoo, supra note 95, at 359–362 (discussing the Thai experience in 
the January 25, 2007, compulsory licensing of Plavix, a heart disease medica-
tion, under the public non-commercial use provision of TRIPS); but see, e.g., 
Beth Jinks & Suttinee Yuvejwattana, Thailand to Buy Generic Plavix in In-
dia, Snubs Sanofi (Update1), BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2007 12:13 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aQ3E3cABtPX
U. 
 107. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011, UNITED NATIONS, at 
41 (2011), 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/(2011_E)%20MDG%20Report%20201
1_Book%20LR.pdf [hereinafter MDG Report 2011]. But see AVERT, supra 
note 100 (“Around 8 million people in low- and middle-income countries are 
currently receiving drugs to treat HIV/AIDS.”). 
 108. MDG Report 2011, supra note 107, at 41. 
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rica.109 Of course, other diseases still run rampant in low and 
middle-income countries. For example, 90% of malaria deaths 
still occur in sub-Saharan Africa, and 85% of new tuberculosis 
cases occur in Asia and Africa.110 
 
3. Definitional Ambiguities & Ambiguities in Scope 
Ambiguities in the interpretation of TRIPS due to the lack of 
substantive guidelines or definitions also hinder its effective 
use by increasing the risk of litigation.111 The Doha Declaration 
merely stated that individual countries have “the right to de-
termine what constitutes a national emergency or other cir-
cumstances of extreme urgency” in deciding to grant a compul-
sory license, and thus did little to ameliorate the different in-
terpretive approaches of developed and developing countries.112 
                                                                                                                                     
 109. Id. at 42. 
 110. Id. at 42, 46. But see id. at 47 (“[U]p to 6 million lives have been saved 
since 1995, thanks to an effective international strategy for the diagnosis and 
treatment of tuberculosis.”). 
 111. Gupta, supra note 76, at 640, 647, 649. See also Hestermeyer, supra 
note 88, at 247 (stating that members may take different views as to the in-
terpretation, but also that a member relying on one interpretation risks liti-
gation from another member relying on a different interpretation); see also 
Gupta, supra note 76, at 637 (“Though TRIPS sets forth minimum standards, 
patent protection is not equivalent in each member state since each state can 
independently interpret these standards.”). 
[M]uch about the interpretation of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment remains in doubt and while the right to access to medicine is a 
useful argument to support a broader, more flexible interpretation, it 
is merely one argument amongst several. It remains uncertain to 
what extent it would carry the day in a dispute settlement proceed-
ing. Faced with the uncertainty about the interpretation . . . and 
pressure exerted by developed countries . . . developing countries 
have largely foregone imposing such licenses to alleviate health con-
cerns. Indeed, in the wake of the TRIPS Agreement many countries 
have limited the provisions on compulsory licensing in their laws. 
Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 239–253. But see Johnston & Wasunna, supra 
note 47, at S17 (noting that a lack of definitions allows member countries to 
have flexibility to interpret TRIPS to meet their own social and cultural val-
ues). 
 112. A New World Order, supra note 86, at 1485. Controversy over the scope 
of a public health crisis exists even after Doha, in which the United States 
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The flexible scope of compulsory licenses lends to abuse which 
further instills resistance and suspicion from pharmaceutical 
companies.113 For example, Egypt’s compulsory license for Pfiz-
er’s Viagra tarnishes the reputation of compulsory licensing 
because erectile dysfunction is clearly a less dire situation and 
one likely not intended to be covered by the public health ex-
ception of TRIPS.114 Such excessive abuse and over-use of com-
pulsory licensing likely encourages pharmaceutical companies 
to aggressively resist valid uses of compulsory licenses to pre-
vent over-expansion of scope.115 In addition to ambiguity in the 
scope of intended diseases, conflicting interpretations exist in 
the type of pharmaceutical products intended for compulsory 
licensing.116 
                                                                                                                                     
argues that the agreement’s officially-listed “HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria 
and other epidemics,” are the only possible emergencies, in contrast to the 
developing countries that argue for a broader interpretation. Id. at 1485 n.72. 
See also Gupta, supra note 76, at 646–647 (“the absence of guidelines, limits 
or direction as to the definition of [public health problem] will lead to incon-
sistent application of the provision and further tension,” as well as include 
diseases “not within the Declaration drafter’s intent.”). Thailand’s compulso-
ry license for the heart disease drug, Plavix, was criticized for not satisfying 
the national emergency requirement, although it was ultimately granted un-
der the “public, noncommercial use” exception. See, e.g., A New World Order, 
supra note 86, at 1486 n.76; see also Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 246–247 
(arguing that though “access to medicine supports a broad interpretation . . . 
[n]evertheless, the provision is not very attractive for Members in such a sit-
uation, as they are reluctant to label their situation one of emergency because 
of the effect that would inevitably have on likely investors and tourists.”). 
 113. See generally McGill, supra note 78, at 87–97 (arguing inconsistencies 
in countries’ interpretation of when to grant compulsory licenses leads to 
negative consequences). 
 114. Id. at 89–90. Pfizer responded by stopping construction of a manufac-
turing facility in Egypt and many pharmaceutical companies have avoided 
investing in Egypt. Id.; Egypt’s aggressive compulsory licensing has contrib-
uted to a decrease in foreign direct investment “from $948 million in 1987 to 
$509.4 million in 2001-02.” Id. 
 115. Toni Johnson, The Debate Over Generic-Drug Trade, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/drugs/debate-over-generic-drug-
trade/p18055 (last updated Aug. 3, 2011) (“Some experts . . . contend that 
drug companies fought so strongly over the licensing of HIV/AIDS drugs be-
cause they foresaw that the ‘national emergency’ line would not end at infec-
tious diseases.”). 
 116. Gupta, supra note 76, at 647. Developed countries define “products 
within the pharmaceutical sector” as products “required by a WTO Member 
while dealing with public health problems.” Id. In contrast, developing coun-
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The scope of countries that should benefit from compulsory 
licensing remains another area of contention.117 Not limiting 
the scope of applicable nations may create a chilling effect on 
the types of drugs pharmaceutical companies choose to invest 
in and develop to avoid the potential for a compulsory license, 
which hurts developing nations most in need of help.118 Inter-
preting the morality exclusion in Article 27(2) also proves diffi-
cult, as there is no universally accepted definition.119 
In addition to causing differing interpretations between coun-
tries, the lack of concrete definitions allows countries to alter 
their position to fit their self-interest and creates potential for 
abuse.120 For example, despite the United States’ narrow inter-
pretation of TRIPS flexibilities, the United States contradicted 
itself during the 2001 anthrax scare by suggesting use of a 
compulsory license for Cipro, a drug that combats the effects of 
                                                                                                                                     
tries include “all medications and vaccines, including active pharmaceutical 
substances used in the prevention and treatment of disease and health care, 
as well as diagnostic products and products used to administer medicines and 
vaccines.” Id. 
 117. See id. at 648. Doha and the Paragraph 6 Decision in referencing 
“countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capabilities,” does not explic-
itly require that those countries must lack the “resources to purchase medi-
cines from the manufacturer.” Id. This ambiguity may qualify “small, wealthy 
nations such as Luxembourg or Singapore” who simply choose not to manu-
facture certain drugs, even though it may not have been the drafters’ inten-
tion. Id. Other countries interpret Doha and the TRIPS flexibilities as apply-
ing to only “developing nations not capable of economically implementing 
such manufacturing technology . . . . Additionally, it remains unclear exactly 
what insufficient manufacturing capacity actually means.” Id.; see also Wat-
son, supra note 13, at 154 (expressing fear that “middle-income nations will 
take advantage of compulsory licensing to the detriment of poorer developing 
countries . . . . Brazil is not Rwanda, which cannot afford to pay.”). 
 118. Gerhardsen, supra note 98 (Merck stating that Brazil should not be 
granted a compulsory license for efavirenz “as the world’s 12th largest econ-
omy, Brazil has a greater capacity to pay for HIV medicines than countries 
that are poorer or harder hit by the disease.”). 
 119. Johnston & Wasunna, supra note 47, at S10, S17. “[E]valuating patent 
applications by weighing their impact on ordre public and morality will re-
quire expertise that is generally not represented in patent offices.” Id. Argua-
bly, “ordre public is not limited to national security but extends to the protec-
tion of human, animal or plant life or health and may be applied to inven-
tions that may lead to serious prejudice to the environment.” Id. 
 120. See McGill, supra note 78, at 88. 
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anthrax.121 On a related note, as India’s government and 
pharmaceutical industry’s capabilities grow, the future of In-
dia’s willingness to grant compulsory licenses and produce 
cheap generic drugs for export to other developing countries is 
questionable.122 Indian companies may opt to serve their self-
interest and become “innovator companies” to compete globally 
with other large pharmaceutical companies.123 
The vagueness of Article 30, which allowed a narrow inter-
pretation to be given by the WTO dispute resolution panel, is a 
further impediment to increasing access to medicines.124 Calcu-
lating adequate remuneration for payment to the patent holder 
when a compulsory license is issued is another obstacle to suc-
cessful use of TRIPS flexibilities and is further complicated by 
the requirement to take the economic value of the authoriza-
tion into account, as TRIPS does not provide guidance to de-
termine what is ‘adequate’ and what is the authorization’s ‘val-
ue.’125 The WTO members’ inability to reach a decision regard-
                                                                                                                                     
 121. A New World Order, supra note 86, at 1471 n.7, 1485 n.70 (noting the 
hypocrisy of the United States, which has challenged compulsory licenses for 
HIV/AIDS drugs while 25 million people dying from AIDS lack access in Afri-
ca, and, at the same time, has suggested use of a compulsory license to ad-
dress anthrax that was clearly not an actual epidemic where only eleven con-
firmed cases were cited). 
 122. See Johnston & Wasunna, supra note 47, at S18. 
 123. Id. “Since 1970, [Indian] domestic firms have increased in number and 
since 1999, about 8-10 of these have developed sufficient in house R&D ca-
pacity to be able to develop new drug molecules as well as produce bulk 
drugs. Indeed, some of these large Indian companies have become multina-
tionals themselves.” WARREN KAPLAN & RICHARD LAING, LOCAL PRODUCTION 
OF PHARMACEUTICALS: INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES, HEALTH, 
NUTRITION, AND POPULATION FAMILY (HNP) OF THE WORLD BANK’S HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT NETWORK (DISCUSSION PAPER) 15 (Joy de Beyer & Alexander S. 
Preker eds., 2005), available at 
http://www.who.int/medicines/technical_briefing/tbs/KaplanLocalProductionF
inal5b15d.pdf. 
 124. See Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 235 (arguing that the scope of Arti-
cle 30 exceptions are “notoriously vague,” which could have allowed the Can-
ada—Patent Panel to interpret it broadly in light of a right to access to medi-
cines, but it failed to do so). See generally id. at 234–239; WTO panel deci-
sions are not binding to subsequent decisions. A New World Order, supra 
note 86, at 1482 n.54. Nevertheless, subsequent parties and panels usually 
rely on the prior decision. Id. 
 125. Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 247–249; TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 
31(h); Chow, supra note 11, at 452–453 (listing possible methods to determin-
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ing parallel importation created a “fundamental flaw” of ambi-
guity.126 In regard to compulsory licensing under the Para-
graph 6 Decision, drugs made for export must be distinguisha-
ble by special labels, colors, or shapes to prevent trade diver-
sion.127 However, lack of monitoring guidelines and repercus-
sions makes the re-exportation issue troubling.128 
4. Limitations Inherent in Developing Countries 
Another impediment to the successful use of the TRIPS flexi-
bilities and the successful achievement of its dual goals is the 
endemic and inherent characteristics of developing countries. 
Taking advantage of TRIPS flexibilities requires technical ex-
pertise, intergovernmental coordination, and legal sophistica-
tion, which are often lacking in developing governments.129 
Thus, TRIPS flexibilities often do not benefit the least devel-
oped countries most in need of help, and rather help middle in-
come countries such as India and Brazil.130 Developing coun-
tries also lack proper disease diagnosis capabilities, which hin-
ders their ability to request proper quantities and types of med-
ications in a compulsory license.131 Developing governments 
                                                                                                                                     
ing adequate remuneration). “For example, Thailand considers a royalty rate 
of 0.5% of the total sales to be compliant.” A New World Order, supra, note 85 
at 1488 n.90. 
 126. Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 234. See generally id. at 230–234 (dis-
cussing parallel importation and the different interpretations amongst coun-
tries). 
 127. Implementation Agreement, supra note 81, ¶ 2(b)(iii). 
 128. Gupta, supra note 76, at 648–649. 
 129. Johnston & Wasunna, supra note 47, at S18–S19. 
 130. AVERT, supra note 100. “But the problem is that these options are 
limited to countries with political clout and financial stability and autonomy. 
As is all too often the case, it is the poorest countries already struggling to 
manage their HIV epidemics that are the least likely to benefit from the cur-
rent system.” Id. See also Gerhardsen, supra note 98 (relating a statement by 
Merck that Brazil should not be granted a compulsory license for efavirenz 
“as the world’s 12th largest economy, Brazil has a greater capacity to pay for 
HIV medicines than countries that are poorer or harder hit by the disease.”). 
 131. See MDG Report 2011, supra note 107, at 44. 
More African children are receiving the recommended medicines for 
malaria, but accurate diagnosis remains critical. Prompt diagnosis 
and treatment are needed to prevent life-threatening complications 
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have been criticized for mass military spending when there are 
existing public health issues, and so they may need to reevalu-
ate their priorities.132 Developing countries and their citizens 
may choose to spend funds on food rather than medication, 
even if costs are reduced, if insufficient funds exist to cover 
both costs.133 Additionally, some developing governments are 
corrupt and may resell medications at higher prices, rather 
than distributing the drugs to their citizens.134 A “scrupulous 
clean hands approach” must be practiced to ensure drugs are 
actually distributed at the lowest profitable prices, and unfor-
tunately such practices have been questionable.135 Further, 
lobbying pressure and conflicting interests may create abusive 
overuse of compulsory licensing where, for example, “the 
chairman of a large generic drug manufacturer was also the 
Chairman of the Health Committee in Egypt’s upper house of 
                                                                                                                                     
from malaria. However, accurate diagnosis is critical. The majority 
of childhood fevers, for example, are not due to malaria, and should 
not be treated with antimalarial drugs . . . . [P]atients [may be] re-
ceiving antimalarial medicines who do not, in fact, have the disease. 
Id. 
 132. See Savoie, supra note 87, at 244 (Thailand has been criticized for 
granting a compulsory license for Plavix after increasing “military spending 
by thirty percent, to over one billion dollars, while cutting public health ex-
penditures by twelve million dollars.”). 
 133. Margo A. Bagley, Legal Movements in IP: Trips, Unilateral Action, Bi-
lateral Agreements, and HIV/AIDS, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 781, 794 (2003) 
(noting that drug costs are not the only factor impacting access to essential 
medicines). 
 134. Whobrey, supra note 12, at 633.  
The incentives created by parallel importation encourages gov-
ernments to favor profits over people, and since many govern-
ments in developing countries are unstable and may be prone to 
corruption, the general public in [least-developed countries] sees 
neither the critical medications nor realizes any benefits or im-
provements from the sale of the drugs.  
Id. 
 135. Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceuti-
cal Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 254 
(2009). “The level of compensation was questionable in the Thais’ treatment 
of Plavix, the compulsory license on Viagra in Egypt was tainted by the ap-
pearance of impropriety and self dealing, and complaints about ‘shadow pric-
ing’ in some Latin American countries merit serious attention.” Id. 
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Parliament at the time the [Viagra] compulsory license was is-
sued [in Egypt].”136 
B. Impediments & Threats 
1. Retaliation by Pharmaceutical Companies 
Developing countries are cautious in using compulsory li-
censes to avoid alienating powerful pharmaceutical companies 
and business repercussions.137 Pharmaceutical companies 
“bring jobs and investments to developing countries.”138 After 
Thailand issued a compulsory license for Abbott’s HIV drug, 
Kaletra, Abbott stated it would not sell certain drugs in Thai-
land and withdrew seven new drug applications from Thai-
land.139 Pharmaceutical companies have also stated that com-
pulsory licenses destroy the incentive to research and develop 
drugs to treat diseases affecting developing countries.140 
2. Retaliation by Developed Countries 
In addition to retaliation by pharmaceutical companies, de-
veloping countries also fear retaliation by developed countries. 
The possibility of trade sanctions imposed by developed coun-
tries against developing countries eliminates the benefits of 
granting a compulsory license because any costs saved by the 
                                                                                                                                     
 136. Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing 
on Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 283, 306–07 (2008). 
 137. See Harris, supra note 86, at 392–393. The forcefulness of the pharma-
ceutical industry’s response in Thailand and Brazil “may have a discouraging 
effect on smaller economies considering similar public health actions but lack 
the legal or political resources to defend themselves on the global stage.” 
Gerhardsen, supra note 98. 
 138. Harris, supra note 86, at 392. Brazil’s decision to grant a compulsory 
license for Merck’s HIV/AIDS drug could divert investments from Brazil. 
Gerhardsen, supra note 98. 
 139. Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands 
from Fiction Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 317, 444 (2009) 
[hereinafter Patent Breaking or Balancing?]. 
 140. Watson, supra note 13, at 153; see Johnston & Wasunna, supra note 
47, at S17. 
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cheaper medications are offset by other economic sanctions.141 
For example, the United States’ Special 301 Watch-List Re-
ports lists countries with inadequate IP protection and allows 
imposition of trade sanctions against the offenders.142 Threat of 
trade sanctions by the United States, which is Thailand’s big-
gest export market, forced Thailand to stop producing a generic 
version of the HIV drug, didanosine, and amend its domestic 
laws to restrict compulsory licenses and parallel importation.143 
Increase in border protection measures to prevent harmful 
counterfeit drugs may also be another form of retaliation by 
developed countries and is a barrier to access to medicines.144 
The 2003 European Union border regulations have led to the 
seizure of significant quantities of drugs, most of which origi-
nated in India and was bound for developing countries such as 
Nigeria and Ecuador.145 
Developed countries also deviate outside of TRIPS to bind de-
veloping countries to more extensive patent protections 
                                                                                                                                     
 141. Patent Breaking or Balancing?, supra note 139, at 447–48. “On why 
Brazil has not issued a CL before [2007], ‘[t]he most obvious reason is the 
fear of an open conflict with the United States.’” Gerhardsen, supra note 98. 
“‘The Thai case, and the recent 301 list report (IPW, US Policy, 30 April 
2007), indeed shows that despite the Doha Declaration and all the commit-
ments made, the US is ready to be extremely aggressive . . . .’” Id. 
 142. Patent Breaking or Balancing?, supra note 139, at 448–49; Watson, 
supra note 13, at 151–153 (Brazil, South Africa, and Thailand have all at 
some point been placed on the 301 Watch-List). 
 143. Johnston & Wasunna, supra note 47, at S19. 
 144. See Harris, supra note 86, at 393; see generally Catherine Dounis, En-
forcing IP Rights Via EU Border Regulations: Inhibiting Access to Medicine or 
Preventing Counterfeit Medicine?, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 717 (2011). 
 145. Seuba Xavier, Border Measures Concerning Goods Allegedly Infringing 
IP Rights: The Seizures of Generic Medicines in Transit 1 (International Cen-
tre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland, Working 
Paper, 2009), available at 
http://www.iprsonline.org/New%202009/Seuba_Border%20Measures.pdf. 
In February 2009 a shipment of second-line generic ARV drugs was 
confiscated by Dutch customs authorities. The 49kg of abacavir sul-
fate tablets produced by an Indian company, Aurobindo, were bound 
for a treatment programme in Nigeria. The tablets were later re-
leased but the seizure highlighted tensions between the European 
Union’s rules on IP rights and World Trade Organization rules con-
cerning the production of generic medicines. 
AVERT, supra note 100. 
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through bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
(“FTAs”).146 Often these FTAs limit the use of TRIPS flexibili-
ties, impose stricter IP standards, and contain data exclusivity 
provisions.147 Appropriately, such agreements are commonly 
called “TRIPS-plus free trade agreements.”148 Despite the nega-
tive effect on access to medicines, developing countries agree to 
FTAs to appease and build a relationship with a powerful de-
veloped country hoping to gain benefits in other trade areas.149 
Further, developing countries have less leverage to negotiate 
favorable terms in FTAs where the agreements are often be-
tween only two countries of unequal negotiating powers and 
thus the developing country lacks the support of other coun-
tries.150 As of early 2013, the United States has FTAs with 
twenty countries.151 Recently, on October 1, 2011, the United 
States signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(“ACTA”) which has been highly criticized for exceeding TRIPS 
limitations to a significant degree, violating human rights, and 
severely affecting access to medicines.152 
                                                                                                                                     
 146. See generally Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 289–292 (discussing the 
challenges posed by FTAs and BITs). TRIPS imposes only minimum stand-
ards of IP protection and explicitly allows countries to impose stricter IP re-
gimes “as long as it does not contravene” TRIPS. Bagley, supra note 133, at 
792. 
 147. Harris, supra note 86, at 393–394. Provisions exceeding TRIPS stand-
ards are usually referred to as TRIPS-plus provisions. Hestermeyer, supra 
note 88, at 289. 
 148. Bhatt, supra note 35, at 617–618. 
 149. Id. at 618. As of 2003, there were at least twenty-three bilateral and 
regional FTAs containing TRIPS-plus provisions and which affect more than 
150 developing countries. Bagley, supra note 133, at 792–93. 
 150. See Hestermeyer, supra note 88, at 291. 
 151. Free Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2013) (listing the current FTAs in which the United States is a par-
ty). 
 152. See Ante, ACTA will be Signed Saturday, FOUND. FOR FREE INFO. 
INFRASTRUCTURE (Sep. 27, 2011), http://acta.ffii.org/?p=779; see generally 
Guadalupe A. Lopez, From Trips to ACTA: Establishing the Intent to Uphold 
Access to Medicine in the Face of Ambiguity, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 22, 2011), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/trips-to-acta-establishing-intent-to-
uphold-access-to-medicine-face-ambiguity. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/acta (last visited Nov. 4, 2011) (listing signing members 
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3. Legal Challenges 
Legal challenges to domestic implementation of compulsory 
licensing laws and to compulsory license grants also hinder the 
effectiveness of TRIPS, as such challenges delay access to es-
sential medicines and add costs to seeking a compulsory li-
cense. In 1997, with the support of the U.S. government, forty 
pharmaceutical companies sued the South African government 
claiming that the South African Medicines and Related Sub-
stances Control Amendment Act of 1997 violated TRIPS.153 
Similarly, in 2000, the United States challenged the compulso-
ry licensing provisions of the Brazilian Industrial Property Law 
in a petition to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.154 As of 
2012, Indian generic manufacturers Cipla and Natco face sepa-
rate patent infringement lawsuits in the Delhi High Court by 
Bayer Pharmaceuticals for its patented cancer drug Nexavar.155 
                                                                                                                                     
and access to full text of ACTA); see ACTA Fact Sheet, OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/acta-fact-sheet-march-2010 
(Mar. 2010) (providing information on the goals of ACTA); see ACTA: Meeting 
U.S. Objectives, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/september/acta-
meeting-us-objectives (Oct. 2011) (explaining that “ACTA is consistent with 
existing U.S. law and does not require the enactment of implementing legis-
lation.”). 
 153. McGill, supra note 78, at 87–88. The Act attempted to allow generic 
production of patented antiretroviral HIV drugs. Id. However, public outcry 
eventually forced the pharmaceutical companies to withdraw the suit. Id. The 
United States also placed South Africa on its Special 301 Watch List and at-
tempted to challenge the Act’s validity before a WTO panel before withdraw-
ing due to public pressure. Watson, supra note 13, at 152. 
 154. Chow, supra note 11, at 454–546. Again, the United States withdrew 
the WTO challenge in exchange for Brazil’s agreement to hold negotiations 
with the United States prior to granting any compulsory license. Id. 
 155. Varun Chhonkar, Nexavar: Compulsory license will severely impact 
global pharma companies, PATENT CIRCLE (Aug. 11, 2011, 12:23 PM), 
http://patentcircle.blogspot.com/2011/08/nexavar-compulsory-license-
will.html. Bayer’s lawsuit, filed in March 2010 against Cipla for its market-
ing of a generic version of Nexavar, is currently pending in the Delhi High 
Court. Id. In May 2011, Bayer also filed an infringement lawsuit against 
Natco in response to Nacto’s compulsory license request. Id.; see HIGH COURT 
OF DELHI, Status of Cases: Orders/Judgments of [CS(OS)1090/2011], 
http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhc_case_status_oj_list.asp?pno=577484 (last vis-
ited Dec. 20, 2011) (for court documents and status of the case —Bayer Cor-
poration & Anr vs. Natco Pharma Limited); see HIGH COURT OF DELHI, Status 
of Cases: Orders/Judgments of [CS(OS)523/2010], 
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III. SPECIAL CHALLENGES IN ACCESS TO CHRONIC DISEASE 
MEDICATIONS 
A current shift in focus from infectious disease compulsory li-
censing to chronic disease compulsory licensing poses new im-
plications for patent holders and those who seek access to such 
medicines.156 “Compulsory licensing practices, however, contin-
ue to expand from responding to purely national emergencies 
toward addressing everyday health care.”157 As the U.N. Secre-
tary General Ban Ki-moon noted: 
Commonly known as chronic or lifestyle-related diseases, the 
main non-communicable diseases are cardiovascular diseases, 
diabetes, cancers and chronic respiratory diseases. While the 
international community has focused on communicable dis-
eases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, the four 
main non-communicable diseases have emerged relatively 




ited Dec. 20, 2011) (court documents and status of the case —Bayer Corpora-
tion & Anr. Vs. Cipla Ltd.); see generally Indian Pharma Patent Cases, 
PATENT DAILY, http://patentdaily.wordpress.com/indian-pharma-patent-cases/ 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2011) (listing a summary of pharmaceutical patent in-
fringement lawsuits filed in India). 
 156. See generally Savoie, supra note 87. 
 157. DeRoo, supra note 95, at 354. 
 158. U.N. Secretary-General, Prevention and Control of Non-communicable 
Diseases, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/66/83 (May 19, 2011). 
In 2008, 36 million people died from non-communicable diseases, 
representing 63 per cent of the 57 million global deaths that year 
[and 80 per cent of those deaths occurred in the developing world]. In 
2030, such diseases are projected to claim the lives of 52 million peo-
ple . . . . While non-communicable diseases have traditionally afflict-
ed mostly high income populations, current evidence shows that the 
spread of such diseases is associated with increasing levels of devel-
opment. Death and disease from non-communicable diseases now 
outstrip communicable diseases in every region except Africa, where 
the rate of such diseases is quickly rising. By 2030, non-
communicable diseases are projected to cause nearly five times as 
many deaths as communicable diseases worldwide, including in low- 
and middle-income countries. 
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Developing countries are beginning to view “cancer as no less 
serious than HIV/AIDS.”159 Thailand’s 2007 compulsory license 
for the blood thinner Plavix (used to treat heart disease) was 
likely motivated by data estimating thirty thousand cancer 
deaths annually compared to twenty-one thousand AIDS relat-
ed deaths in Thailand in 2006.160 Similarly, the Indian generic 
drug maker, Natco, cited over 24,000 Indian deaths per year in 
its compulsory license application for Bayer’s liver and kidney 
cancer drug, Nexavar.161 
                                                                                                                                     
Id. at 2; see David Brennan, former chief executive of AstraZeneca, Address 
on Behalf of AstraZeneca to the World Health Assembly (May 17, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.ifpma.org/fileadmin/content/Events/Other_IFPMA_Events/17_Ma
y_2011/David_Brennan_Speech_Luncheon_17May2011.pdf (WHO research 
shows that 90% of deaths from non-communicable diseases are in developing 
countries, and will increase by 17% by 2015. Africa is seeing the greatest in-
crease by 27% compared to Europe’s 6% increase); see generally Raising the 
Priority of Non-communicable Diseases in Development Work at Global and 
National Levels, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.who.int/nmh/events/2010/ncd_facts_20100913.pdf (2010) [herein-
after Raising the Priority]. 
 159. The 10 burning questions on the Government Use of Patents on the four 
anti-cancer drugs in Thailand, THE MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE 
NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY OFFICE THAILAND, at 2, 
http://www.moph.go.th/hot/Second_white_paper_on_the_Thai_CL_%5BEN%5
D.pdf (Feb. 2008). 
 160. Johnson, supra note 115. In 2005, heart disease was estimated to be 
the second leading cause of death in Thailand. Porapakkham et al., Estimat-
ed causes of death in Thailand, 2005: implications for health policy, 
POPULATION HEALTH METRICS (May 18, 2010), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2885317/ppd/1478-7954-8-
14.pdf. 
 161. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PATENT OFFICE, No. 32/2011, at 13349, Dec. 
8, 2011 (India), available at 
http://donttradeourlivesaway.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/official_journal_12
082011_part_i.pdf [hereinafter Natco CL Request]. “In 2008 approximately 
20,144 cases of [liver cancer] were reported in India, and more than 18,043 
Indians died of [liver cancer].” Id. at 13347. “In 2008, about 8,900 Indians 
were diagnosed with kidney cancer, and about 5,733 died from the disease.” 
Id. at 13348. Nacto argues that Bayer’s life-saving product is exorbitantly 
priced and of limited availability in India, and Indians “should be able to ac-
cess this drug irrespective of their caste, creed, affordability etc.” Id. at 
13352. Natco states that it can price the generic version “31 times cheaper 
than Bayer’s sorafenib tosylate [commonly known as Nexavar] or 3% of the 
price at which Bayer sells the drug in India.” James Love, Update on the So-
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Developing countries, despite evidence of growing deaths 
from chronic disease within their populations, face special chal-
lenges in using compulsory licenses to combat chronic diseases 
as compared to infectious disease compulsory licensing. First, 
the Doha Declaration uses language of epidemics and infec-
tious disease.162 Second, lack of public attention and misconcep-
tion that chronic disease affects only wealthy countries re-
moves pressure on pharmaceutical companies to provide such 
medications at affordable prices for populations in developing 
countries.163 Further, because chronic diseases can be combat-
ted by non-pharmaceutical means, it may be more difficult for 
developing countries to cite compulsory license use as neces-
sary.164 Lastly, expanding the scope of compulsory licenses to 
chronic diseases will likely be met by even stronger resistance 
from pharmaceutical companies because the inclusion of 
“chronic, non-communicable diseases like cancer hits at the 
                                                                                                                                     
rafenib Tosylate Compulsory Licensing Case in India, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY 
INT’L (Oct. 10, 2011, 4:32 PM), http://lists.keionline.org/pipermail/ip-
health_lists.keionline.org/2011-October/001392.html. 
 162. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 70, ¶ 5(c) (“[I]t being un-
derstood that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tu-
berculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”). 
 163. See McGill, supra note 78, at 88; see Savoie, supra note 87, at 239. Ad-
vocacy efforts supporting compulsory licenses have focused on access to 
HIV/AIDS medications. Id. Pharmaceutical companies are likely to avoid the 
public relations nightmare faced when they attempted to sue South Africa 
after its passage of the Medicine and Related Substance Control Amendment 
Act of 1997, intended to begin generic product of HIV drugs. Id.; see generally 
MDG Report 2011, supra note 107 (failing to include chronic disease as a de-
velopment, but including infectious diseases); see Preventing Chronic Diseases 
a Vital Investment, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.who.int/chp/chronic_disease_report/contents/part1.pdf (2005) at 4, 
8–10 (explains ten widespread misunderstandings about chronic disease and 
the reality). 
 164. See Raising the Priority, supra note 158, at 3–4 (noting that chronic 
diseases are preventable by life-style changes such as tobacco use, diet, phys-
ical activity, and alcohol use). In contrast, the “WHO recommends that coun-
tries use a combination of antimalarial medicines to reduce the risk of drug 
resistance” as the best treatment for the infectious disease of malaria. What 
is the best treatment against malaria? Why combine drugs?, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/features/qa/26/en/index.html (2009) (last 
visited May 10, 2012). 
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heart of the drug industry’s profit model.”165 For example, a 
dramatic decline in foreign direct investment and research es-
tablishments was seen in Thailand after it granted a compulso-
ry license for a heart disease medication in 2007.166 
IV. RECOMMENDATION & PROPOSAL 
The shortcomings of TRIPS reveal that compulsory licensing 
is an ineffective solution to the problem of access to essential 
medicines. The impediments of TRIPS further illuminate the 
likely inability of TRIPS to effectively cope with the increasing 
global threat of chronic diseases. Drug prices need to be re-
duced in order to increase access to medicines. However, broad-
range compulsory license use is not a viable solution because it 
jeopardizes the research and development structure of pharma-
ceutical companies.167 Pharmaceutical companies argue that 
strict patent laws and high drug prices are necessary to recoup 
large research and development costs (“R&D”).168 Thus, to low-
                                                                                                                                     
 165. Johnson, supra note 115. See also Savoie, supra note 87, at 241 (“Medi-
cations for chronic diseases play a much larger role in pharmaceutical portfo-
lios than do medications for infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS.”). Phar-
maceutical companies focus drug discovery on chronic disease because “pa-
tients look forward to months, even years, of treatment” and hence prolonged 
profits whereas infectious disease often only requires short-term therapy. 
Steven J. Projan, Why is Big Pharma Getting Out of Antibacterial Drug Dis-
covery?, 6 CURRENT OPINION MICROBIOLOGY 427, 428 (2003). 
 166. McGill, supra note 78, at 91 (“Gross private investment growth fell 
from 10.6% to .5% in 2007, its lowest since 2000” largely due to the $10 bil-
lion decline in foreign direct investment in 2007). 
 167. DeRoo, supra note 95, at 354. “Given that pharmaceutical companies 
make a marginal profit of less than 20% across all their products the view 
that pharmaceuticals are ‘grossly overpriced’ is at best naïve and for the de-
velopment of novel [products] it is fatal.” Projan, supra note 165, at 428. 
 168. Johnson, supra note 115. 
Research and development averages between ten and fifteen years in 
the United States and is included as part of the twenty-year pa-
tent—meaning the average drug patent, once on the market, lasts 
about eleven years, according to the lobby group PhRMA. R&D for 
2010 was about $67 billion, growing less than $11 billion between 
2006 and 2010 . . . . Few drugs ever recoup their R&D costs, notes 
PhRMA, and even fewer ever reach the incredible earning potential 
of a drug such as Lipitor, which made nearly $11 billion in sales in 
2010 but expired in the United States in 2011. Overall, drug compa-
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er drug prices, the current business model of recouping R&D 
costs through profits should be adjusted. A new business model 
to recoup R&D costs, while lowering prices, should be ap-
proached through funding and incentives.169 R&D models built 
on public-private partnerships170 that help in financing and 
product development may help promote efficiency, access, in-
novation, and information sharing.171 Alternative sources of 
funding R&D through partnership efforts, rather than expand-
ing the scope of compulsory licenses, should be used to lower 
drug prices and increase access.172 If alternative sources of 
funding are used, rather than the current business model of 
using profits to recoup R&D costs, then pharmaceutical com-
panies should be more willing to lower drug prices and reduce 
resistance to compulsory licenses. A funding approach that re-
lies less on recouping R&D costs will also encourage develop-
ment of drugs that may primarily benefit developing coun-
tries173 because, despite the lower profit potential, a greater 
                                                                                                                                     
nies are spending less on research and bringing fewer drugs to mar-
ket than a decade ago. 
Id. But see Bob Young & Michael Surrusco, Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against 
The Drug Industry’s R&D “Scare Card,” PUBLIC CITIZEN, July 2001 (arguing 
that the pharmaceutical industry’s claim that extraordinary profits are need-
ed “to fund expensive, risky and innovative research and development [R&D] 
for new drugs” is misleading). 
 169. See Brennan, supra note 158 (relating a statement of interest made by 
the CEO of AstraZeneca regarding working together to create “commercially 
sustainable business models” that enable healthcare access to more people). 
 170. See Frederick M. Abbott, IP and Public Health: Meeting the Challenge 
of Sustainability 32 (GLOBAL HEALTH PROGRAMME, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, 
WORKING PAPER NO. 7/2011, Nov. 15, 2011). Such public-private organizations 
include the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Drugs for Neglected Diseases 
initiative (“DNDi”), and the Medicines Patent Pool (“MPP”). Id. 
 171. See generally id. 
 172. See James Love, Will the UN backtrack on accessible medicine?, 
CENTER FOR HEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT, 
http://www.cehurd.org/2011/10/will-the-un-backtrack-on-accessible-medicine/ 
(Oct. 31, 2011) (“Developing countries cannot improve access to cancer drugs 
unless they grant more compulsory licenses on patents, or undertake more 
fundamental and radical changes in the way research and development . . . 
for cancer drugs is financed.”). 
 173. See DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES INITIATIVE, 
http://www.dndi.org/overview-dndi.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2011). DNDi is 
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percentage of revenues will constitute pure profit and will not 
count against R&D expenses.174 Such a result will hopefully 
close the “10/90 research gap,” a disparity resulting from only 
10% of the worldwide R&D being devoted to health problems 
that affect the poorest 90% of the world’s population.175 
Further, compulsory licenses should be limited in scope to in-
crease legitimacy, decrease resistance and fear of retaliation, 
and decrease abuse. If the scope of compulsory licenses is bet-
ter defined, then all players would have proper notice. More 
specifically, if pharmaceutical companies are re-assured that a 
compulsory license would not open a floodgate and destroy a 
wide-array of patents, they will be more willing to acquiesce.176 
Similarly, better guidance will help the least developing coun-
tries to invoke legitimate compulsory licenses and prevent abu-
sive use of compulsory licensing, such as Viagra in Egypt and 
Cipro in the United States.177 Minimizing discretionary use will 
bring legitimacy to the compulsory license process.178 However, 
                                                                                                                                     
a public-private partnership that promotes research and development for 
neglected diseases that often afflict developing populations. Id. 
 174. See generally Research and Development, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story079/en/index.html 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2011). 
 175.  
The 10/90 research gap refers to the finding that only 10% of the 
US$55 billion global spending on health research is devoted to dis-
eases or conditions that account for 90% of the global burden of dis-
ease. For each year of potential life lost in the industrialized world, 
more than 200 times as much is spent on health research as is spent 
for each year lost in the developing world. 
Id. 
 176. Johnson, supra note 115 (“[D]rug companies fought so strongly over 
the licensing of HIV/AIDS drugs because they foresaw that the ‘national 
emergency’ line would not end at infectious diseases.”); Nexavar to Storm 
India: Compulsory License Plea Filed, BIOSPECTRUM, 
http://www.biospectrumasia.com/content/020911IND17008.asp (Sept. 2, 
2011) (last visited May 10, 2012) (“[E]xtensive use of compulsory licenses will 
in the long-term undermine and threaten the patent system.”). 
 177. See McGill, supra note 78, at 88–96 (arguing that the “[c]itizens of the 
most underdeveloped countries have suffered as a result of the discretionary 
allowances of the Doha Declaration.”). 
 178. Id. at 75 (“Unchecked discretion for compulsory licensing has made 
compulsory licenses a dirty word for economic development and erected a 
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some flexibility in scope is necessary to allow adaptation of 
compulsory licenses to changing global disease threats.179 
TRIPS should therefore be amended to require WTO panels 
to take a more active role in compulsory license applications, as 
opposed to allowing complete discretion on the part of national 
governments.180 Since approving generic production of a pa-
tented medication already may take several years—due to the 
various obstacles discussed above—WTO panel decisions will 
not significantly prolong the process.181 To determine whether a 
compulsory license is necessary and the claimed disease is a 
true national public health emergency,182 the WTO panel 
should use an analysis akin to U.S. courts’ strict scrutiny test 
as applied to laws infringing on U.S. citizens’ Constitutional 
rights.183 The WTO panel should consider the national disease 
burden as well as the country’s ability to cope, the marketed 
price of the patented medication compared to the proposed 
                                                                                                                                     
barrier between generic drugs and the least developed countries that need 
them.”). 
 179. See id. at 83 (arguing that “a pre-determined list of diseases that may 
benefit from compulsory licensing is not in the public’s best interest; diseases 
that threaten public health mutate, evolve, and present unforeseeable de-
grees of gravity, mortality, contagiousness, and treatability.”). 
 180. See id. at 97 (“An administrative body through the WTO with repre-
sentatives from both developed and developing countries may be in a better 
position to determine when countries may issue a compulsory license” and 
give developing countries a louder voice). 
 181. See Cipla Launches Nexavar Generic at 1/10th of Bayer’s Price, MONEY 
CONTROL, http://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/cipla-launches-
nexavar-generic-at-110thbayer39s-price_450770.html# (Apr. 8, 2010) (last 
visited May 10, 2012) (“Bayer has succeeded in blocking the launch of [the] 
generic version [of the patented drug Nexavar] for two years by filing a writ 
petition in Delhi High Court . . . .”). 
 182. See Reichman, supra note 135, at 254 (noting an argument for 
“[n]arrowly tailored licenses that focus on real public health needs and avoid 
the appearance of impropriety, and that also ensure consumers actually ob-
tain lower prices.”). 
 183. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 155 n.4 
(1938). U.S. courts apply strict scrutiny where a fundamental U.S. Constitu-
tional or a fundamental right is infringed. Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny. To pass strict scrutiny, the 
policy must be justified by a compelling government interest, narrowly tai-
lored, and be the least restrictive means for achieving the interest. Id. 
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price of the generic, the consumer’s ability to pay, and market 
availability of the patented drug.184 The panel should also 
weigh the harm to the pharmaceutical company’s profit and 
future floodgate impact.185 
In addition to a strict scrutiny analysis by a WTO panel prior 
to the compulsory license, TRIPS Article 31(b)186 should be 
amended to require good-faith prior negotiations even during a 
public health emergency. This will also hopefully reduce the 
burden and amount of cases that reach the proposed WTO pan-
el. Pharmaceutical companies and developed countries would 
be less resistant to compulsory licenses if they felt they had a 
say in license determinations. In fact, because negotiations pri-
or to compulsory licensing are already in practice and ex-
pected,187 such an amendment would not be a drastic departure 
from current practice. A timeline for deal-making negotiations 
should be clearly established in TRIPS, limiting parties’ nego-
tiation period to a set number of days before a compulsory li-
cense can be filed with the proposed WTO panel.188 After the 
deadline for negotiations expires, the WTO panel would then be 
compelled to step in and conduct its strict scrutiny analysis. 
Further, to prevent a party from stalling or refusing to negoti-
ate, negotiations must be conducted in good faith, and the WTO 
                                                                                                                                     
 184. See Reichman, supra note 135, at 254; see generally Natco CL Request, 
supra note 161. 
 185. See generally Brennan, supra note 158; See also Public Policy Position: 
Compulsory Licensing, MERCK (July 2008), 
http://www.merck.com/about/views-and-
positions/compulsory_licensing2009.pdf. 
 186. TRIPS, supra note 32, art. 31(b). 
 187. See Chow, supra note 11, at 454–546. The United States withdrew the 
WTO challenge to Brazil’s compulsory licensing provisions of the Brazilian 
Industrial Property Law in exchange for Brazil’s agreement to hold negotia-
tions with the United States prior to granting any compulsory license. Id. See 
also Natco CL Request, supra note 161, at 13358. 
 188. See Natco Pharma Applies for India’s First Compulsory License, ALL 
ABOUT PATENTS (Aug. 2, 2011, 9:14 PM), 
http://patentsind.blogspot.com/2011/08/natco-pharma-applies-for-indias-
first.html. Indian patent law requires a three year waiting period after a pa-
tent is granted before a compulsory license may be filed. Id. See also Natco 
CL Request, supra note 161, at 13354. 
2013] TRIPS & THE COMPULSORY LICENSE 1225 
 
panel should consider in its analysis whether good faith negoti-
ations occurred.189 
The narrowed scope of the compulsory license should be bal-
anced with a market approach to provide access to a broad 
range of medicines. Global pharmaceutical companies should 
be encouraged to compete with generic drug makers through 
government incentives and sell needed patented medication 
using a three-tier pricing system.190 To encourage pharmaceu-
tical companies to compete with generic drug manufacturers, 
governments should incentivize local manufacture by the glob-
al pharmaceutical company.191 The demand for generic drugs 
exists in developing countries, hence there is a marketplace 
and thus a profit potential as well.192 Local manufacture and 
                                                                                                                                     
 189. Natco’s December 6, 2010, letter requesting a license was turned down 
“point blank, without any discussion whatsoever” in a refusal letter sent 
three weeks later, on December 27, by patentee Bayer. Id. at 13358–59. 
 190. See Watson, supra note 13, at 154–57. 
 191. See generally KAPLAN & LAING, supra note 123. It is important to note 
that because generic production occurs only in countries that have manufac-
turing capability, global pharmaceuticals need only locally manufacture in 
middle-income developing countries where generic competitors exist. Id. Mid-
dle-income developing countries presumably have more political stability 
than low-income developing countries and so the risk of local manufacture is 
less, although inherently present. Id. Governments of middle-income develop-
ing countries, like India, Thailand, and Brazil, also have more ability to pro-
vide incentives for local manufacture. Id. 
 192. See THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION, WHO/EDM/PAR/2004.5 (2004), 
at 31–41. 
The global generic medicines market is worth over US$ 80 billion, 
about 30% of total sales . . . . In high-income countries, “originator” 
(patented) pharmaceuticals account for two-thirds of sales and the 
share of these in total sales grew substantially from 1990 to 2000. In 
low-income countries, these [“originator” (patented)] pharmaceuti-
cals account for only about one-third of total sales. Generic pharma-
ceuticals represent almost two-thirds of total sales in low-income 
countries and about 60% of sales in middle-income countries. Brand-
ed generics are much more important than unbranded generics in 
sales. Some countries in transition have experienced a rapid change 
in the composition of their pharmaceutical sales, with generics rapid-
ly being replaced by originator brands or by pharmaceuticals made 
under licence from originators. 
Id. at 31. 
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competition by global pharmaceutical companies with generic 
drug manufacturers would reduce the problem of patent in-
fringement, eliminate the need for broad scope compulsory li-
censes, and provide for a wider range of drugs accessible to de-
veloping countries. Local manufacture will also give pharma-
ceutical companies greater control of their product as well as 
provide developing countries with safer drugs.193 Global phar-
maceuticals should be free to then open factories in developing 
countries and compete with local generic manufacturers, thus 
offering healthy market competition.194 However, since generic 
drugs are sold more cheaply, global pharmaceuticals will have 
to develop a differential pricing system to effectively compete 
with the generic drug makers.195 
Pharmaceutical companies should differentially price drugs 
in low-income developing countries, middle-income developing 
countries, and developed countries according to the national 
median urban income in the respective country category.196 
                                                                                                                                     
 193. See Johnson, supra note 115. 
[I]mporting inexpensive patented drugs and generics from other 
countries will erode safety standards . . . . And some experts note a 
massive influx of generic drugs could help mask increases in the 
counterfeit drug trade, already a multibillion dollar industry and ex-
pected to see a 90 percent jump in global sales from 2005 to 2010. 
The U.S. Food and Drug Agency estimates counterfeit drugs repre-
sent as much 30 percent of all drugs sold in some developing coun-
tries, but amount to less than 1 percent of drugs in the developed 
world. 
Id. The majority of private manufacturers in India are “small-scale and have 
problematic quality assurance systems and procedures.” KAPLAN & LAING, 
supra note 123, at 15. 
 194. See McGill, supra note 78, at 90–91. Global pharmaceuticals have pre-
viously built manufacturing facilities in developing countries. See id. Pfizer 
was in the process of constructing a manufacturing facility in Egypt before 
Egypt granted a compulsory license for Viagra. Id. Some companies have also 
set up research establishment in Thailand and more would have been built 
had Thailand not been aggressive in its compulsory licensing. Id. 
 195. See generally Whobrey, supra note 12 (suggesting a 2-tier pricing 
structure based on GDP). 
 196. See generally PRASHANT YADAV, DIFFERENTIAL PRICING FOR 
PHARMACEUTICALS: REVIEW OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE, NEW FINDINGS AND 
IDEAS FOR ACTION, U.K. DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
(2010), available at 
http://www.accesstomedicineindex.org/sites/www.accesstomedicineindex.org/f
 
2013] TRIPS & THE COMPULSORY LICENSE 1227 
 
Prices set at the urban population’s income levels, rather than 
the rural population, will be more economically feasible for 
global pharmaceutical companies.197 Further, a three-tier pric-
ing system will allow pharmaceutical companies to balance 
lower prices in developing countries with the higher prices in 
developed countries. Because the majority of sales occur in de-
veloped countries, lower prices in developing countries will not 
be a significant burden on profits.198 Such reduced profits 
should be considered as “additional” profits that otherwise 
would not exist, instead of being negatively viewed as “re-
duced” profits. Moreover, to incentivize pharmaceutical compa-
nies to employ a three-tier pricing system, TRIPS must be 
amended to prohibit parallel importation and diversion of 
drugs. Governments and international organizations should 
regulate and police the re-importation issue, and the WTO 
should impose trade sanctions on repeat offenders. 
Governments of both the developed and the developing coun-
tries should provide more incentives to global pharmaceutical 
companies to invest in a local factory.199 Such incentives could 
                                                                                                                                     
iles/yadav_differential_pricing_for_pharmaceuticals.pdf; see generally 
Jayashree Watal, Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essen-
tial Drugs, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (Apr. 2001), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wto_background_e.pdf. 
 197. See YADAV, supra note 196, at 5 (“It is important to note that differen-
tial pricing is not a panacea to ensuring access. For patients with affordabil-
ity levels lower than the marginal cost of manufacturing, donor subsidies and 
government support will continue to be required.”). 
 198. See Kevin Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovations 
for Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 159, 160 (2006) 
(80% to 90% of global sales of patented pharmaceuticals occur in the thirty 
wealthiest countries in the OECD. Patented pharmaceuticals could be offered 
at generic prices to middle and low income countries, which include more 
than 84% of the world’s population, with only a small reduction in global 
R&D cost recovery). “In 1999, the 15% of the world’s population who live in 
high-income countries purchased and consumed about 90% of total medicines, 
by value. . . . The market share of the USA alone rose from 18.4% of the world 
total in 1976 to over 52% in 2000.” THE WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION, supra 
note 192, at 31. 
 199. See, e.g., TURKISH HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY REPORT 4 (Aug. 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.invest.gov.tr/en-
US/infocenter/publications/Documents/HEALTHCARE.INDUSTRY.pdf (in-
troducing incentives to attract foreign investors to Turkey). 
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include: tax breaks, free land to build the factory, or govern-
ment funds to build the factory.200 Both developed and develop-
ing country governments can provide tax breaks to pharmaceu-
tical companies in return for selling medicine at reduced prices 
for developing populations. Developed governments can base 
tax incentives on a gradient system, where tax deduction in-
creases as the quantity of reduced priced drugs supplied to de-
veloping countries increases. Developing governments can give 
tax breaks for a set number of years to the pharmaceutical 
company. Thus, any burden is shared by all, the pharmaceuti-
cal companies, the developed countries, and the developing 
countries. 
The pharmaceutical company would be allowed to make and 
keep more of the profits from selling their drug in the local 
market while using workers and labor from the local country.201 
This suggested solution would allow the global pharmaceutical 
company to make a profit, while providing a public service of 
increasing access to safe medicine and stimulating the local 
economy by using their labor. As a result, a pharmaceutical 
company’s public relations image will also improve. By driving 
the generic drug makers out of business, global pharmaceuti-
cals will not have to worry about enforcing their patent rights 
as the market will take care of it. Although, in this suggested 
solution, global pharmaceuticals would be making less profit in 
developing countries than in developed countries, they would 
still be making a profit and not incurring a loss, particularly 
when pricing is based on the urban population coupled with 
government and market incentives. Further benefits include 
improved goodwill and reputation, increased control, as well as 
reduced parallel importation and illegal competition. 
Differential pricing is only feasible when coupled with official 
support, such as amending TRIPS to prohibit parallel importa-
tion.202 Potential for diversion of drugs from one market to an-
                                                                                                                                     
 200. See Watson, supra note 13, at 156. 
 201. See KAPLAN & LAING, supra note 123, at 15 (“India’s rich natural re-
sources and manpower have not been fully exploited.”); see id. at 32 (noting, 
however, that few developing countries would have the PhD level skills and 
technical staff for many of the jobs required in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 202. See YADAV, supra note 196, at 6. “Despite its theoretical appeal and 
some notable successes, the use of differential pricing as a tool to improve 
access to medicines is not widespread. The primary causes include risks of 
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other eliminates the incentive for companies to engage in dif-
ferential pricing, leading to a single, world-wide uniform pric-
ing scheme.203 Banning parallel exports will increase the sup-
ply available to needy consumers because it removes the de-
mand by distributors.204 Only the intended needy consumers 
will have access, and thus, as the drug will not be siphoned by 
distributors, the number of such consumers who will actually 
have access to the drug will increase. Re-importation should be 
policed and regulated.205 Countries should implement domestic 
legislation to comply with this amendment to ban parallel im-
portation, and countries in violation should be punished with 
trade sanction. Further, violating countries would be harmed 
by backlash from pharmaceutical companies who would likely 
opt not to locally manufacture their product.206 Further, violat-
ing countries will also likely suffer a decrease in foreign direct 
investment.207 
Any solution will need to address the realities and challenges 
of compulsory licensing, including the differing priorities of IP 
and public health interests. An easy solution does not exist and 
every solution comes with its own set of additional challenges. 
For example, any amendment to TRIPS—whether to limit the 
scope of compulsory licenses by better defining “public health 
emergency,” creating WTO panels that employ strict scrutiny 
to assess the validity of a compulsory license request, requiring 
good faith prior negotiations, or banning parallel importation—
is a difficult task. In fact, there has only been one amendment 
                                                                                                                                     
physical arbitrage (lower priced product flowing back to the high income 
markets) . . . .” Id.; see Watson, supra note 13, at 157. 
 203. See generally A. Bryan Baer, Price Controls Through the Back Door: 
The Parallel Importation of Pharmaceuticals, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 109 (2001) 
(arguing a uniform pricing scheme would likely be set at a high price based 
on affordability and profit potential from developed countries). 
 204. See id. at 134. 
 205. See Watson, supra note 13, at 157. 
 206. See McGill, supra note 78, at 90 (describing how Pfizer responded to 
the Viagra compulsory license by halting construction of a manufacturing 
plant in Egypt). 
 207. See McGill, supra note 78, at 90–92. Foreign direct investment (“FDI”) 
in Thailand declined by $10 billion in 2007 as a backlash to widespread com-
pulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. Id. Similarly, FDI in Egypt dropped 
from $948 million in 1987 to $509.4 million in 2001-02. Id. 
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to TRIPS in the approximately fifteen years since its incep-
tion.208 An amendment to TRIPS requires acceptance by two-
thirds of the WTO member countries, and the amendment will 
only affect those member countries having accepted the 
amendment.209 Furthermore, once an amendment is adopted, 
domestic legislation must be drafted and adopted in the indi-
vidual countries.210 Moreover, amending TRIPS to better define 
“public health emergency” is in itself a delicate task, where a 
balance between removing ambiguity and retaining enough 
flexibility to adapt to changes is important. Defining and limit-
ing “public health emergency” will eliminate ambiguity, de-
crease abuse, and decrease resistance from developed countries 
and the global pharmaceutical industry. However, even a more 
concrete definition requires enough flexibility to withstand 
changes in time and adapt to changes in trends. In addition, a 
market approach to supplement amendments to TRIPS also 
poses difficulties. For example, much coordination would be 
necessary among WTO member country governments, global 
pharmaceutical companies, and local generic manufacturers to 
prevent parallel importation, encourage local manufacture and 
healthy competition, and create a three-tier pricing scheme. 
Coordination and internal restructuring within the global 
pharmaceutical industry would also be required, which will 
likely be a time consuming and complicated process. 
CONCLUSION 
TRIPS has been important in making strides toward access 
to essential medicines for developing populations. Despite no-
ble efforts, however, many still lack access to life-saving medi-
cations. The spirit of TRIPS and its dual goal of improving 
medical access while preserving patent rights should be con-
tinued and enhanced. Legitimacy cannot be sacrificed for effi-
                                                                                                                                     
 208. How to Accept the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/accept_e.htm (last visited Mar. 
29, 2013) [hereinafter Amending TRIPS]. 
 209. See Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last updated 
Nov. 5, 2012). 
 210. Amending TRIPS, supra note 208. 
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ciency and, accordingly, compulsory license use should be lim-
ited in scope to true public health emergencies with the help of 
WTO panel decisions. Market forces, such as government in-
centives, international cooperation and public-private partner-
ships between advocacy groups and pharmaceutical companies 
should be used as the dominant route to improving access to 
medicines and preserving patent rights. 
Collaboration with pharmaceutical companies is the most 
commercially viable solution for balancing TRIPS’ dual goals. 
Working against pharmaceutical companies by merely broad-
ening compulsory license use is not realistically viable, as the 
many obstacles to compulsory license use has shown. With 
chronic diseases on the rise, TRIPS and pharmaceutical busi-
ness models need to be adjusted to combat new global concerns. 
There is still a long road ahead to improving global access to 
medications and, although TRIPS was a major step, it cannot 
be the end of the road. New measures and methods need to be 
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